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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In many instances, the seller of a good or service knows more about this good or service than
the consumer himself. Such expert services or goods have been called credence goods (Darby
and Karni, 1973). Examples include the services provided by repair professionals, taxi drivers,
agricultural consultants, medical doctors or lawyers. In all of these professions the seller not only
provides the service but also acts as an expert diagnosing the consumer’s requirements. A taxi
driver will advise his customers as to the best route to take, medical doctors will recommend a
speciﬁc treatment and auto mechanics will tell their clients whether they need new sparkplugs
or en entire starter engine. This gives the expert to bias his recommendation towards the more
proﬁtable service for him. Nevertheless, the existing literature on expert-customer relationships
shows that, under some conditions, the expert provides an eﬃcient treatment (see e.g. Darby and
Karni, 1973,o rE m o n s ,1997, 2001).1 In a recent model of credence goods that uniﬁes previous
analyses, Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) show that an expert has always interest to serve his
customers eﬃciently when the three following assumptions hold: i) consumers are homogenous, ii)
consumers are committed to an expert once this one makes a recommendation, and iii) the type of
treatment provided is veriﬁable. The key to this result is that, in equilibrium, the expert charges
the same markup for all possible treatments, removing any incentive to mislead his clientele. Any
set of prices that does not respect this equal margin condition would lead to a fraudulent behavior
of expert.
In the present paper, we extend the model than of Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) in two
directions. First, we relax the assumption that the expert always conducts serious diagnostic tests.
Such tests are costly in terms of time and material, so skimping on the initial investigation may
indeed be rational for the expert. This issue has already been addressed in a few papers (see
Pessendorf and Wolinsky, 2003, and Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2009). However, theses papers
focus on situations where the expert’s diagnosis eﬀort is unobservable. We make the opposite
extreme assumption that the customer is aware of the eﬀort expended on diagnosis. Assuming an
expert’s diagnosis eﬀort unobservable or observable is extreme in both cases, but our assumption
might be more appropriated in some cases (doctors, agricultural consultants,...) than in others
(car mechanics, lawyers, ...). Here we consider observable diagnosis in order to focus on other
mecanisms than the incentives for expert to exploit the informational problems associated with
the diagnosis eﬀort. Second, and this is the main novelty of this work, we assume that consumers
1Others works focus about situations where consumers cannot observe the type of service provided, so the expert
may defraud the consummers by misrepresenting a low-cost service as a costly one (see e.g. Pitchik and Schotter,
1987 ,W o l i n s k y1993,F o n g2005 or Alger and Salanié, 2006).
2are risk-adverse. This assumption is particular relevant in several cases. The pesticide used by
farmers is one ﬁrst example. This type of product is generally supplied in combination with
some advice on the precise product to use and the conditions for using it. An important body
of the literature in agricultural economics shows that farmers are risk-averse. This aversion helps
explain the intensive use of risk-reducing inputs such as pesticides (see e.g. Moschini and Hennessy,
2001, and Carpentier and Weaver, 1997). The supply of car repair to women is another example.
Numerous studies in sociology, psychology, experimental economics, and econometrics, women are
found to be more averse to risk than men (see e.g. Byrnes et al., 1999, Croson and Gneezy, 2009,
and Cohen and Einav, 2007). Hence, considering risk aversion might also help explain why women
might be treated diﬀerently when taking their car to the auto mechanic. For instance, an Australian
report of the Consumer Law Centre Victoria concludes that in automobile repairs industry women
do not receive the same standard of service as men and pay an extra costs (Foster, 1997). The
author also indicates that women place a high priority on services such as a recommended repair
network when purchasing insurance, in order to avoid a discrimination in repair services.
We show that considering risk-averse consumers can modify the eﬃciency result of literature de-
s c r i b e di nD u l l e c ka n dK e r s c h b a m e r(2006) quite dramatically. Indeed, the presence of risk-premia
drives the expert not to conduct a proper diagnosis and to choose either overtreatment (to provide
the more expensive treatment) or undertreatment (to provide the less expensive treatment) when
conducting a diagnosis and providing the appropriate treatment would have been eﬃcient. Our
result occurs even when the three assumptions i), ii) and iii) hold. Hence our paper shows that
the risk-neutral consumers assumption made in the literature is not without loss of generality.2
Moreover we show that the introduction of competition between experts only alleviates the incen-
tive to provide a false treatment if the risk premium decreases with the income. This means that
customers may be still ineﬃciently served even with intense competition between expert providers.
The force that drives our result is the tension between the equal mark-up pricing that allows
the expert to commit to provide the appropriate treatment and the risk borne by the consumers
with this type of tariﬀ. Because of risk aversion, the customer is in fact willing to pay a premium
for overtreatment and undertreatment (risk free tariﬀs ) .T h i sb r e a k st h ee q u a l i t yo fm a r g i n sa c r o s s
services and provides the expert with an incentive to save on diagnostic costs and provide the same
treatment anyway. This tension still exists when there is competition between identical experts.
2In a physician-patient model, Sülzle and Wambach (2005) discuss their results when patients are risk averse.
They conclude that assuming risk neutral or risk averse patients does not modify the equilibrium behavior. Their
model is speciﬁct om a r k e t sw h e r ep r i c ea r en o tﬂexible, for instance where prices are regulated by an authority.
Conversely to models of credence goods with price setting (considerated by Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006), in
ﬁxed-price models there exists at least one equilibrium with a positive level of fraud even when consumers are
risk-neutral (see e.g. Wolinsky, 1993).
3Nevertheless, if the lower price level reduces the risk premium, the incentive to always provide the
same treatment is reduced by competition.
The paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 present the model assumptions and the
equilibrium when consumers are risk-neutral. The market equilibrium when consumers are risk-
averse is analyzed in Section 4.S e c t i o n5 introduces competition an Section 6 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We use a model of credence goods similar to Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006). Each consumer has
a problem which can be of two possible types: major or minor. The cost of a major treatment is
, and the cost of a minor treatment is ,w i t h . A minor treatment can only solve a minor
problem while a major treatment can solve either a major or a minor problem. The consumer
knows that he has a problem but he does not know its type. Ex-ante each consumer knows that
his problem is major with a probability  and minor with a probability (1 − ). By conducting
the proper diagnostic tests an expert can detect the true type of the problem. The expert can
then supply an appropriate treatment or exploit his superior information to supply a minor or a
major treatment regardless of the test results. We refer to these last two treatment strategies as
undertreatment and overtreatment respectively. Without diagnosis, an expert cannot detect the
true type of the problem. In this case, he can not supply an appropriate treatment and can only
choose to always supply a minor or a major treatment.
Following the literature on valuation of credence goods we consider four assumptions. We
use the terminology and deﬁnitions proposed by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) to characterize
these assumptions. Homogeneity Assumption (): all consumers have the same probability  of
having the major problem. The parameter  is the gross gain of a consumer when his problem is
solved.3 Otherwise he gets 0. Commitment Assumption (): Once a recommendation is made,
the customer is committed to undergo a treatment by the expert.4 Liability Assumption ():A n
expert cannot provide the minor treatment if the major is needed. And Veriﬁability Assumption
( ): An expert cannot charge for the major treatment if he has provided the minor treatment.
Assumption  rules out the overcharging problem.5
Conversely to the literature we consider a ﬁfth assumption: the Risk aversion Assumption ()
3We assume that it is always eﬃcient that a consumer is treated when he has a problem  − 0.
4The commitment assumption is justiﬁed in a monopoly setting, in markets with high economies of scope between
diagnosis and treatment or in markets with symmetric information about the treatment supplied (see Emons, 2001,
and Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006).
5When the consumer cannot evaluate the treatment received, he may require and receive a minor treatment but
be charged for an major treatment. In the literature, this fraudulent expert behavior is referred as overcharging.
Assumption  rules out this fraudulent behavior.
4(consumers are risk-averse). The utility of a consumer is given by a Von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function () with  the consumer’s gain and (0) = 0.
The market environment is described as follows. There is a continuum of identical consumers
with total mass of 1. Both treatments and the diagnosis are provided by one expert. The magnitude
(i.e. type) of the consumer’s problem can only be known by the expert if he invests in making
a proper diagnosis. As in the bulk of the literature, we assume that the diagnostic fee charged
to the consumer is exogenous and equals to the cost  borne by the expert (see e.g. Dulleck and
Kerschbamer, 2006). However, contrary to the literature, we suppose that expert may decide not to
make a thorough diagnostic, in which case, the diagnosis cost is zero and the consumer is exempted
from paying the diagnostic fee.6
In the ﬁrst period of the game, the expert posts prices  and  for a major treatment and
a minor treatment respectively and commits to conduct or not a diagnosis. Consumers observe
theses actions and decide whether to visit the expert or not (second period). In the third period,
nature determines the type of the consumer’s problem (major or minor). In the fourth period,
the expert conducts a diagnosis or not, recommends a treatment, charges for it and provides it.7
The action of making a diagnostic is observed by the client but the result of this diagnosis is not.
When a diagnostic is not conduced, the expert can not observed the action of the nature. With
the assumption () the game just described is a complete information game. We determine the
subgame-perfect equilibrium of that game.
3 Equilibrium when consumers are risk-neutral
Our objective in that section is to determine whether the non observability of the diagnosis result
is a source of ineﬃciency when consumers are risk neutral. We consider as the eﬃcient benchmark
the case where the diagnosis result is both observed and veriﬁable so that it can be contracted
upon by the consumer and the expert. This deﬁnition of the eﬃcient solution allows us to point
out the impact of information asymmetry on the expertise outcome. Let us deﬁne precisely when
a solution is considered as eﬃcient under asymmetric information.
Deﬁnition 1 As o l u t i o ni se ﬃcient when the treatment exerted by the expert is the same as in a
market without asymmetric information.
6Assuming that the expert (respectively the consumers) bears a diagnosis cost (respectively pay a diagnosis fee)
0,w i t h 0  0, when no diagnosis or only a "light" diagnosis is performed does not modify qualitatively our
results.
7The commitment assumption () rules out the possibility to consumers to reject the expert’s recommendation.
Moreover the veriﬁability assumption ( ) rules out the possibility to expert to charge an other treatment than the
provided treatment.
5With risk-neutral consumers, the existing literature concludes that when Assumptions , ,
and  hold, but  is violated, the expert ﬁnds it proﬁtable to charge the same margin over
all treatments and serve customers honestly. All consumers are thus eﬃciently served under equal
markup (see Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 of Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006). This result is achieved
when the expert bears a diagnosis cost whatever his strategy (appropriate treatment, overtreatment
or undertreatment). When we assume that an expert may avoid to conduct a diagnosis, consumers
are also always eﬃciently served but not necessarily under equal markup. More speciﬁcally, we
show that for a high diagnosis cost ,i ti sm o r ep r o ﬁtable for the expert to always supply the
same treatment in order to save the diagnosis cost. The treatment provided depends on the cost
diﬀerence between the two treatments. For a high cost diﬀerence, the expert always provides
the minor treatment whereas if the cost diﬀerence is lower, the expert always provides the major
treatment. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the consumers are eﬃciently served, i.e. as
in an environment with symmetric information.
We specify in the following Lemma the tariﬀ proposed by the expert at the equilibrium and
ﬁgure 1 illustrates the partition of equilibrium — appropriate treatment (), overtreatment ()
or undertreatment () — according to values of .
Lemma 1 When Assumptions H (homogeneity), C (commitment) and V (veriﬁability) hold and
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 −  =  −  with  =  −  +( 1− )( − ),f o r ≤ {(1 − )( − )( − ( − ))},
 − −  with  = ,f o r ≥ (1 − )( − ) and  ≥
−
 ,
 − −  with  =( 1− ),f o r ≥ ( − ( − )) and  ≤
−
 .
The solution is eﬃcient.
Proof. See Appendix 1
Lemma 1 shows that assuming that undertreatment and overtreatment may be performed
without diagnosis does not modify the literature’s main results: customers are eﬃciently served
by the expert. The intuition for this result is as follows. With an equal mark-up tariﬀ,t h ee x p e r t
is able to credibly commit to reveal the correct diagnosis result. Moreover, for a risk neutral
consumer only the expected price matters. Thus, the consumer surplus for this particular tariﬀ
is the same as for any other tariﬀ with the same expected price level when the diagnosis result is
known to the consumer. Therefore, under asymmetric information the expert is able to capture
6the same consumer surplus as with symmetric information. Without diagnosis, the information
is no longer relevant. As a result, the expert behavior is the same with and without information
asymmetry. Hence the eﬃciency result.
This lemma is consistent with Lemma 1 of Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009) which shows that
in a competitive market for credence goods where the diagnosis eﬀort is observable and veriﬁable
the market is eﬃcient in any equilibrium.8
We now turn to the risk-averse case.
4 Equilibrium when consumers are risk-averse
When consumers are risk-neutral, the eﬃciency result occurs. In the following we show that this
is no longer the case when consumers are risk-averse (Assumption  holds). Let us determine the
equilibrium ﬁrst before discussing its eﬃciency.
We begin by describing the new price setting strategy of the expert. Start with the expert




such that the markup is the same whatever the treatment provided
¡
 =  −  + 
¢
. In that case, the expert is induced to provide the right treatment and thus his
proﬁti sg i v e nb y − . Before the diagnosis and the expert’s recommendation, the consumer’s
gain is uncertain: this one is  −− with a propability  and  −− with a probability 1−.
Hence the consumer’s expected utility is given by ( −  − )+( 1− )( − ( −  + ) − ).
At this stage we should note that the consumer bears risk because of the equal margin price. In
other words, to commit to provide the right treatment, the expert cannot fully insure the consumer
by proposing the same price for each treatment. As a consequence, the consumer incurs a risk
premium  ∈ (0(1 − )( − )] with respect to a risk-free tariﬀ. The equal mark-up tariﬀ proposed
by the expert is thus such that:
 ( −  − )+( 1− ) ( − ( −  + ) − )=0=( −  −  +( 1− )( − ) − ) (1)
Therefore, the expert posts prices satisfying:
 =  −  +( 1− )( − ) −  and  =  −  +  (2)




with −−.H e r e ,t h e
8Note that the conditions of the partition of eﬃcient equilibrium are slightly diﬀerent to ours. Conversely to our
framework, if the treatment a consumer got is insuﬃcient he loses  but he may buy a major treatment (at marginal
cost) from the same or another provider in a following period. In our monopoly framework considering the same
assumption might be interpreted as a warranty but would not modify qualitatively our results.
7treatment provided is always the major treatment (overtreatment). In that case, no diagnosis is
required and thus the consumer does not bear the diagnosis cost. Moreover, the administration of
the major treatment fully insures the consumer. The consumer’s utility is ( −),a n dt h ep r i c e s
posted are  =  and    −  + .




such that −−. Then, the treatment
provided is always a minor treatment (undertreatment). As before the consumer does not bear
any diagnosis cost but bears the risk of a possibly insuﬃcient treatment. As a consequence there
exists a risk premium  ∈ (0(1 − )] such that:
((1 − ) −  − )= (−)+( 1− ) ( − )=0 (3)
and the expert posts prices satisfying:
 =( 1− ) −  and −  +  (4)
T h ee x p e r th a st od e t e r m i n et h em o s tp r o ﬁtable tariﬀ between the three options presented
above. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium presented in the following Lemma is the result of
this comparison.
Lemma 2 When Assumptions H (homogeneity), C (commitment), V (veriﬁability) and R (risk






⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩




(1 − )( − )





 − −  with  = ,f o r ≥ (1 − )( − ) −  and  ≥
−−
 ,
 − −  with  =( 1− ) − ,f o r ≥ ( − ( − )) +  −  and  ≤
−−
 .
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Basically, we show in that lemma that the strategy of the expert in the presence of risk-
averse consumers also depends on the diagnosis cost as well as the cost diﬀerence between both
treatments. The main diﬀerence with the previous lemma is in the relevant thresholds. Now the
risk aversion of the consumers induces the expert to bias its pricing strategy towards the two cases
where the consumer is fully or better insured: overtreatment and undertreatment.9 Indeed, to
credibly commit to the revelation of the correct diagnosis result, as before, the two mark-ups must
9For the consumer, an appropiated treatment is more risky than undertreament whenever  .
8be equal. This leads the consumer to bear risk whereas under overtreatment, the consumer is sure
to always pay the same price. As a result, in the presence of risk-aversion, the expert is more
inclined to propose the overtreatment to capture the risk premium than in the risk neutral case.
Now that the equilibrium with risk averse consumers is established, the key question concerns
the eﬃciency of this equilibrium: to what extent does the introduction of risk aversion lead the
expert to bias his behavior with respect to the observable diagnosis outcome case. To answer
that question we have to determine the equilibrium under symmetric information with risk-averse
consumers.
If the expert wants to follow an overtreatment strategy, he does not conduct a diagnosis, so
his proﬁt does not depend on the information available. If we denote by ∗ the proﬁto ft h e
expert under symmetric information with overtreatment ()a n db y the proﬁto ft h ee x p e r t
under asymmetric information with overtreatment, we have: ∗ =  ≡  − .I n t h e s a m e
way, undertreatment () does not require diagnosis so that using the same notation we have also
∗ =  ≡ (1 − ) −  − .
On the other hand, if the expert wants to commit to provide the appropriate treatment ()
, the expert proﬁt under symmetric information is given by ∗ ≡ ( − )+( 1− )( − ) ,
which is maximised under the participation constraint of the consumer given by ( −  − )+
(1 − )( −  − ) ≥ 0. Thus the expert charges  =  =  −  and his proﬁti sg i v e nb y :
∗ ≡  −  −  − ( − ) (5)
So an expert that provides an appropriate treatment earns a higher proﬁt than under asymmetric
information since: ∗   ≡  −  −  −  − ( − ).
The following Lemma presents the equilibrium under symmetric information (eﬃcient solution),
and the Proposition concludes on the eﬃciency of the equilibrium given in Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 The eﬃcient solution with risk averse consumers:
(i) the expert sets a price  if the major treatment is diagnosed and a price  if the minor
treatment is diagnosed with  =  =  − ,f o r ≤ {(1 − )( − )( − ( − )) + },
(ii) the expert does not undertake diagnosis and sets a price  =  for the major treatment only
for  ≥ (1 − )( − ) and for  ≥
−−
 ,
(iii) the expert does not undertake diagnosis and sets a price  =( 1− ) −  for the minor
treatment only for  ≥ ( − ( − )) +  and  ≤
−−
 .
Proof. See Appendix 3.
9Based on Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we have the following implication.
Proposition 1 When Assumptions H (homogeneity), C (commitment), V (veriﬁability) and R
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Our main conclusion concerns the ineﬃciency of the equilibrium for an intermediate level of the
diagnosis cost. Let us explain that result. If the diagnosis cost  is low enough, under symmetric
information, the expert undertakes the diagnosis. Moreover, the risk aversion of the consumer
induces the expert to fully ensure the consumer by setting the same price for both treatments.
Hence the information symmetry about the diagnosis outcome allows the combination of this
type of "full insurance" tariﬀ and the completion of the right treatment. In case of asymmetric
information, in order to induce a truthful revelation of the diagnosis result, the expert is constrained
to diﬀerentiate the price according to the treatment proposed. In other words, full insurance and
information revelation are not compatible. Thus, under symmetric information, the full insurance
allows the expert to capture the risk premium while under asymmetric information the expert
is constrained to leave that risk premium to the consumer that bears a risk. For a higher level
of diagnosis cost, the expert does not undertake the diagnosis but can propose a major or a
minor treatment. As we noted above, the information plays no role here since no diagnosis is
undertaken. As a result, the trade-oﬀ between overtreatment and undertreatment is not aﬀected
by the asymmetric information. Let us focus on the incentive to provide an appropriate treatment.
In the trade-oﬀ between appropriate treatment and overtreatment, the combination of risk aversion
and asymmetric information clearly distorts the comparison in favor of the overtreatment. This
explains why the equilibrium with overtreatment is ineﬃcient whenever (1 − )( − ) − 
(1 − )( − ).T h e e ﬃcient equilibrium is a appropriate treatment. The trade-oﬀ between the
appropriate treatment and the undertreatment is apparently less clear since in both cases the
consumer is not fully insured. Nevertheless the risk incurred under undertreatment is still present
under the symmetric information while the risk in case of appropriate treatment is only due to
the asymmetric information. Hence as before, there is a bias against appropriate treatment: for
( −( − ))+ − ( −( − ))+, the equilibrium with undertreatment is ineﬃcient.
The eﬃcient equilibrium is an appropriate treatment. Figure 2 illustrates theses ineﬃcient zones
(hatched) with a quadratic utility function.
This Lemma shows that assuming risk-neutral consumers is not without loss of generality.
When consumers are risk-neutral ( and  null) we ﬁnd the equilibrium price described in Lemma
101. The customers are thus eﬃciently served by the expert. When consumers are risk-averse, the
provision of the appropriate treatment induces a risk-premium. This risk premium does not exist
in markets where the diagnosis result is observed since the expert can separate the price from the
treatment provided and can propose a risk free tariﬀ ( =  =  − ). So, in markets where there
is asymmetric information on the diagnosis, the presence of a risk-premium drives the expert to
choose overtreatment or undertreatment while an appropriate treatment would be eﬃcient.
We would like to add two remarks about our result. First, our assumption about the diagnostic
plays an important role. Indeed, if the expert must conduct a proper diagnosis (i.e. the case
where  =0 ), all consumers are eﬃciently supplied with an appropriate treatment. The expert
has never interest to deviate even if the equal mark-up tariﬀ generates a risk premium. Second,
the usual eﬃciency result resurfaces when the liability assumption () holds. Let us explain that
result. With the liability assumption, undertreatment is de facto prohibited and  equilibrium
prices satisfy:  −  ≥  −  and  + ( − )= −  −. As a result, the expert may provide the
appropriated treatment with a risk free tariﬀ:  =  = −. Thus, consumers are always eﬃciently
served. This crucial eﬀect of liability on eﬃciency is consistent with the recent experimental study
of Dulleck et al. (2010). These experiments show that, contrary to the predictions of the theoretical
literature (see e.g. Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006), veriﬁability of the treatment provided alone
has no signiﬁcant impact on the degree of eﬃciency, while the addition of liability has a highly
signiﬁcantly positive impact on the degree of eﬃciency (see Main Result 1 and Table 3).
5 Competition and market equilibrium
We consider now an extended version of our model with two identical experts that compete in
price. As before, an expert proposes a tariﬀ for each treatment and a possible diagnosis at price
. Our purpose is to study to what extent our previous result is aﬀected by the introduction of
competition.
Not surprisingly, the competition between the two identical experts drives the prices down to
the treatment costs.
In an equilibrium with appropriate treatment (), the two experts propose a diagnosis at price
 with prices  =  and  = . Nevertheless, as before, such a tariﬀ induces risk for the consumers.
The expected utility of the consumer is (−−)+(1− )(−−)=(−−(1 − )−−e )
where e  is the corresponding risk premium. We should o b s e r v eh e r et h a ts i n c et h ep r i c e sa r el o w e r
than under monopoly, the risk premium e  is potentially diﬀerent from .I t i s l o w e r t h a n  if
the consumer has a decreasing absolute risk aversion function  and higher than  in case of an
11increasing absolute risk aversion function. The  is an equilibrium as long as an expert is not
induced to deviate by proposing, for instance, overtreatment at a price higher than  without
diagnosis. The highest price the consumer accepts to pay for overtreatment is +(1−)++e .
Therefore, the deviation is proﬁtable as long as +(1−)++e  ≥ , i.e.  ≥ (1 − )( − )−e .
In an  type equilibrium, the experts provide no diagnosis and competition also constrains
both experts prices for the major treatment to  = .T h ep r i c e for the minor treatment is such
that   . The corresponding utility of the consumer is thus equal to ( − ).I f a n e x p e r t
deviates towards the undertreatment and sets a price for the minor treatment, the expected
utility of the consumer becomes (−)+(1−)(−)=((1−)−−e ) where e  is the risk
premium. Therefore, the highest price  is equal to −−e  so that the deviation is proﬁtable as
long as  ≤
−− 
 . Again, as before, the position of the risk premium e  with respect to  depends
on the form of the utility function .
Moreover, assumption () ensures that there is no equilibrium where each expert proposes a
diﬀerent tariﬀ. Indeed, all the consumers would prefer only one of these two tariﬀs and would thus
induce one expert to deviate.
We derive from the previous discussion the following lemma and proposition that respectivelly
speciﬁes the tariﬀ proposed by experts at equilibium, and summarizes the impact of the competition
on the provision of the eﬃcient treatment.
Lemma 4 When Assumptions H (homogeneity), C (commitment), V (veriﬁability) and R (risk
aversion) hold and L (liability) is violated, the competition between two identical experts leads to
the following equilibrium:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
 −  =  −  =0for  ≤ {(1 − )( − )( − ( − )) + e } −e ,
 =  and  for  ≥ (1 − )( − ) −e  and  ≥
−− 
 ,
 and  =  for  ≥ ( − ( − )) + e  −e  and  ≤
−− 
 .
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(1 − )( − )






Based on Lemma 4 and Proposition 1, we have the following implication.
Proposition 2 Competition between experts reduces the ineﬃciency if the consumers have a de-
creasing absolute risk aversion VNM function and magniﬁes the ineﬃciency if the consumers have
12an increasing absolute risk aversion VNM function.
Hence, provided that the consumer is characterised by a decreasing absolute risk aversion
(DARA) utility function, competition between experts reduces ineﬃciency in the sense that the
range of parameters where the experts provide overtreatment and undertreatment is narrower than
under monopoly. However ineﬃciency remains a possible outcome despite the competition between
experts. Moreover, competition actually increases the range of parameters over which ineﬃcient
outcomes arise if the consumer is characterised by a increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA)
utility function. The intuition is basically the same as the one with a monopoly. The appropriate
treatment requires equal mark-up but the introduction of competition drives the mark-up down to
zero. To fully ensure the consumers, an expert could be induced to deviate from that equilibrium
by providing overtreatment at a higher price because of the risk premium. Nevertheless, since the
prices in the  equilibrium with competition are lower than under monopoly, the risk premium
changes. If the risk premium is lower, the deviation is less likely to be proﬁtable. In that case,
competition reduces the likelihood of an ineﬃcient equilibrium. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude a
higher risk premium that would increase the incentive to provide an overtreatment. In that case,
the introduction of competition worsens the provision of ineﬃcient treatments.
Finally, as in the monopoly case, the eﬃciency result obtains when the liability assumption
holds too.  equilibrium prices satisfy:  −  ≥  −  and  + ( − )= +( 1− ).A s a
result, experts may provide the appropriated treatment with a risk free tariﬀ  =  = +(1−).
Consumers are eﬃciently served.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we show that the risk-neutral consumers assumption considered in the literature on
expert services is not without loss of generality. Information revelation requires that all treatments
are sold at the same proﬁt margin. However, with risk-averse consumers such equal margin tariﬀs
generate a risk premium. This may drive the expert to abstain from diagnosis and supply an
ineﬃcient treatment. This result holds in a monopoly setting and under Bertrand competition.
Our model sheds new light on the relationship between the consumers’ risk attitudes and the
market’s capacity to solve the fraudulent expert problem. For instance, a high degree of risk aver-
sion means that the mechanism market does not a good job and induces ineﬃcient overtreatment or
undertreatment. Our ﬁndings suggest that risk averse consumers like farmers and women are more
likely to be "mistreated" by experts. This may be a serious problem given the current need for
13farmers to switch to environmentally friendly practices10 and the increasing proportion of women
in the customers of auto repair shops or other experts.11
Our model might be considered restrictive in several respects: homogeneous consumers, only
two types of problems and treatments. However, we have chosen this simple framework in order
t oa s s e st h er o b u s t n e s so ft h ee ﬃciency result of the Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006)’s benchmark
with risk averse consumers. Finally, in this paper we focus on the incentives for experts to exploit
the informational problems associated with the diagnosis result. Future researchs can adress the
informational problems associated with the treatment supplied or the diagnosis eﬀort.
10Such practices require that the farmer should ﬁt its pesticide use to the level of the pest pressure.
11The US National Institute for Automobile Service Excellence (ASE) reports that in 2001 in United States 65%
of customers who take their vehicles to a repair shop for service and repair are women.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Proof Lemma 1
Under equal markup prices (i.e.  −  =  − ) and diagnosis committed, the consumer is
provided honestly and its expected utility is ( −  − )+( 1− )( −  − ).U n d e r e q u a l
markup prices (i.e. − = −) without diagnosis committed, the expert is fraudulent12.I nt h a t
case, overtreatment or undertreatment is more proﬁtable.
Under markup prices more important for the major problem (resp. the minor problem), the
expert is fraudulent and has not interest to conduce a diagnosis, the consumer’s utility is ( −)
(resp. (−)+( 1− )( − )).
Since consumers are risk-neutral, the maximal proﬁt per customer for a monopolist is:  ≡
 −−−( − ) under equal markup,  ≡  − under overtreatment, and  ≡ (1 − ) −
under undertreatment. It is easy to see that i)  ≥  iﬀ  ≤ (1 − )( − ), ii)  ≥  iﬀ
 ≤ ( − ( − )), and iii)  ≥  iﬀ  ≥
−
 .13
The consumers are eﬃciently served when they are served as in an environment without asym-
metric information. The expert that provides an overtreatment (resp. an undertreatment) does
not conduce a diagnosis, so he charges the same prices and has the same proﬁt what the diagnosis
result is common knowledge or not (∗ ≡  −  and ∗ ≡ (1 − ) − ).14
Without asymmetric information, the expert that provides an appropriate treatment maximizes
his proﬁtg i v e nb y∗ ≡ ( − )+( 1− )( − ) under the consumer participation constraint
( −  − )+( 1− )( −  − ) ≥ 0. The expert charges  =  =  −  and has the same
12The expert is fraudulent as so far as he may provide an unappropriated treatment.
13The superscript , ,a n d indicates the treatment supplied: appropriate treatment, overtreatment and
undertreatment.
14The superscript ∗ indicates an eﬃcient environment, i.e. without asymmetric information.
16proﬁt as in the environment with asymmetric information ( = ∗ = −−−(−)).S o
the treatment provided with asymmetric information is eﬃcient whatever the value of parameters
considered.
Appendix 2: Proof Lemma 2
Under equal markup prices (i.e. − = −) and diagnosis committed, the consumer is provided
honestly and its expected utility is ( −−)+(1− )( −−). The most proﬁtable price
 is such that ( −  − )+( 1− )( −  − )=0 .W e d e ﬁne the risk premium  by the







. Under equal markup prices (i.e. − = −) without diagnosis committed,
the expert is fraudulent. In that case, overtreatment or undertreatment is more proﬁtable.
Under markup prices more important for the major problem (resp. the minor problem), the
expert is fraudulent and has not interest to conduce a diagnosis, the consumer’s utility is ( −)
(resp. (−)+( 1− )( − )).
Since consumers are risk-averse, the maximal proﬁt per customer for a monopolist is:  ≡ −
−−−( − ) under equal markup,  ≡ − under overtreatment, and  ≡ (1 − )−−
under undertreatment. It is easy to see that i)  ≥  iﬀ  ≤ (1 − )( − ) − ,i i ) ≥ 
iﬀ  ≤ ( − ( − )+ − , and iii)  ≥  iﬀ  ≥
−−
 .
Appendix 3: Proof Lemma 3
The consumers are eﬃciently served when they are served as in an environment without asym-
metric information. The expert that provides an overtreatment (resp. an undertreatment) does
not conduce a diagnosis, so he charges the same prices and has the same proﬁt what the diagnosis
result is common knowledge or not (∗ =  ≡  −  and ∗ =  ≡ (1 − ) −  − ).
Without asymmetric information, the expert that provides an appropriate treatment maximizes
his proﬁtg i v e nb y∗ ≡ ( − )+( 1− )( − ) under the consumer participation constraint
( −  − )+( 1− )( −  − ) ≥ 0. The expert charges  =  =  − ,h i sp r o ﬁti ss u p e r i o r
than in the environment with asymmetric information: ∗ ≡  −  −  − ( − )   ≡
 −− −−( − ). It is easy to see that i) ∗ ≥ ∗ iﬀ  ≤ (1 − )( − ), ii) ∗ ≥ ∗
iﬀ  ≤ ( − ( − )+, and iii) ∗ ≥ ∗ iﬀ  ≥
−−
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 − −  with  = ,f o r∀ ≥ (1 − )( − ) and ∀ ≥
−−
 ,




Figure 1: Expert’s choice according to  and  with risk-neutral consumers.
(with  =0 ,  =1 2 and  =1 2)
19Figure 2: Expert’s choice according to  and  with risk-averse consumers.
(with ()= − 
22,  =0 ,  =1 2,  =1 2
and e  =
−−
 with  =
1−
√
1+(−1)22
 )
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